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Abstract
We consider assignment problems where heterogeneous indivisible goods are to be assigned to indi-
viduals so that each individual receives at most one good. Individuals have single-peaked preferences
over the goods. In this setting, first we show that there is no strategy-proof, non-bossy, Pareto efficient,
and strongly pairwise reallocation-proof assignment rule on a minimally rich single-peaked domain
when there are at least three individuals and at least three objects in the market. Next, we characterize
all strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, top-envy-proof, non-bossy, and pairwise reallocation-proof assign-
ment rules on a minimally rich single-peaked domain as hierarchical exchange rules. We additionally
show that strategy-proofness and non-bossiness together are equivalent to group strategy-proofness
on a minimally rich single-peaked domain, and every hierarchical exchange rule satisfies group-wise
reallocation-proofness on a minimally rich single-peaked domain.
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1
1 Introduction
We consider the well-known assignment problem where heterogeneous indivisible goods are to be as-
signed to individuals so that each individual receives at most one good. Such problems arise when, for
instance, the Government wants to assign houses to the citizens, or hospitals to doctors, or a manager
wants to allocate offices to employees, or tasks to workers, or a professor wants to assign projects to
students. Individuals are asked to report their preferences over the goods and the designer decides the
allocation based on these reports. We analyze the structure of such decision process satisfying some de-
sirable properties such as (group) strategy-proofness, efficiency, non-bossiness, (top-)envy-proofness, and
(pairwise/group-wise) reallocation-proofness.
(Group) strategy-proofness ensures that a (a group of) dishonest individual(s) cannot improve her
(their) assignment(s) by misreporting her (their) preference(s).1 Efficiency says that the assignments can-
not be improved in the sense of Pareto (that is, everyone is weakly better off and someone is strictly
better off). Non-bossiness says that a person cannot change the assignment of any other person without
changing her own assignment. Envy-proofness says that if an individual is envious at another individual
(that is, if she strictly prefers the assignment of the individual to her own assignment), then she cannot
harm the individual by misreporting her preference. Top-envy-proofness, in a sense, can be viewed as
envy-proofness with respect to the top-ranked object of the envious individual. Pairwise/group-wise
reallocation-proofness rules out the possibility of an obvious case of manipulation where a pair/group of
individuals misreport their preferences and become better off by redistributing the objects they obtain at
the misreported profile.
Svensson (1999) shows that the set of strategy-proof, non-bossy, and neutral assignment rules on the
unrestricted domain is the set of serial dictatorships, if every individual is assumed to be assigned an
object.2,3 Pápai (2000) characterizes strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, non-bossy, and reallocation-proof as-
signment rules on the unrestricted domain as hierarchical exchange rules. These rules can be regarded as
generalizations of Gale’s well-known top trading cycle (TTC) procedure.4 Pycia and Ünver (2017) char-
acterizes strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and non-bossy assignment rules on the unrestricted domain as
trading cycles rules.5
1A group of individuals improve their assignments if each member in it is weakly better-off and some member is strictly
better-off.
2An assignment rule is neutral if its outcomes do not depend on the identities of the objects.
3Whenever it is clear from the context, we use the term “domain” to refer to a set of preferences or a set of preference profiles.
4Top trading cycle (TTC) is due to David Gale and discussed in Shapley and Scarf (1974).
5Ergin (2000) shows that an assignment rule satisfies Pareto efficiency, neutrality, and consistency if and only if it is a simple
serial dictatorship rule (he uses somewhat weaker properties to show his result). Ehlers and Klaus (2006) characterize all Pareto
efficient, strategy-proof, and reallocation-consistent assignment rules as efficient priority rules. Later, Ehlers and Klaus (2007) and
Velez (2014) characterize a slightly larger class of assignment rules by weakening these characterizing properties. Karakaya et al.
(2019) analyze TTC rules in the context of house allocation problem with existing tenants.
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1.1 Our motivation and contribution
As we have mentioned, Svensson (1999), Pápai (2000), and Pycia and Ünver (2017) assume that the indi-
viduals can have arbitrary preferences over the goods. However, it is well-known that in many circum-
stances preferences of individuals are restricted in a particular way. Single-peakedness is known as one of
the most common such restrictions. It arises when goods can be ordered based on certain criteria and
individuals’ preferences respect that ordering in the sense that as one moves away from her top-ranked
(peak) good, her preference declines. For instance, in the problem of assigning hospitals (houses) to doc-
tors (citizens), hospitals (houses) can be ordered based on their locations on a street and an individual
may like to be assigned as close as possible to her favorite location, in the problem of assigning tasks
to students, tasks can be ordered based on their technical difficulties and an individual may like to get
a task that she is technically more comfortable with, etc. This motivates us to explore the structure of
strategy-proof assignment rules when individuals have single-peaked preferences. Instead of focusing
only on the maximal single-peaked domain, we do our analysis on a class of single-peaked domains that
we call minimally rich. A single-peaked domain is minimally rich if it contains all left single-peaked and
all right single-peaked preferences.6
There are two main results in this paper. The first one says that there is no strategy-proof, non-bossy,
Pareto efficient, and strongly pairwise reallocation-proof assignment rule on a minimally rich single-
peaked domain, when there are at least three individuals and three objects in the market (Theorem 5.1).
The second result characterizes all strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, top-envy-proof, non-bossy, and pair-
wise reallocation-proof assignment rules on a minimally rich single-peaked domain as hierarchical ex-
change rules (Theorem 7.1). We additionally show that strategy-proofness and non-bossiness together are
equivalent to group strategy-proofness on a minimally rich single-peaked domain (Proposition 4.1), and
every hierarchical exchange rule satisfies group-wise reallocation-proofness on a minimally rich single-
peaked domain (Proposition 7.1).7
Ours is not the first paper to deal with single-peaked domains, Damamme et al. (2015) and Bade (2019)
consider single-peaked domains in the context of housing markets.8 Damamme et al. (2015) provide an
algorithm which is Pareto efficient on a single-peaked domain and Bade (2019) introduces the notion of
the crawler algorithm and shows that it is Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and individually rational on the
maximal single-peaked domain.9 To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first paper to
analyze the structure of assignment rules on the single-peaked domains.
6A single-peaked preference is left (right) if every alternative on the left (right) of the peak is preferred to every alternative
on the right (left) of the peak.
7This, in particular, implies that if we replace pairwise reallocation-proofness by its stronger version group-wise reallocation-
proofness, the conclusion of Theorem 7.1 does not change.
8Shapley and Scarf (1974) introduce the housing market, a model (with equal number of individuals and objects) in which
each individual owns a unique indivisible object (a house) initially.
9In fact, Bade (2019) shows that the crawler algorithm satisfies a stronger version of strategy-proofness called OSP-
implementability.
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1.2 Organization of the paper
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce basic notions and notations that
we use throughout the paper. In Section 3, we define domains and discuss their properties. In Section
4, we define assignment rules and discuss their standard properties. We present an impossibility result
(non-existence of strategy-proof, non-bossy, Pareto efficient, and strongly pairwise reallocation-proof as-
signment rules on a minimally rich single-peaked domain) in Section 5. Section 6 introduces the notion
of hierarchical exchange rules. In Section 7, we present our main result: a characterization of all strategy-
proof, Pareto efficient, top-envy-proof, non-bossy, and pairwise reallocation-proof assignment rules on
a minimally rich single-peaked domain as hierarchical exchange rules, and in Section 8, we discuss the
independence of these characterizing properties. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Basic notions and notations
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a (finite) set of individuals and A be a (non-empty and finite) set of objects. We
denote the set of all strict linear orders over the elements of A by L(A).10 An element P of L(A) is called
a preference over A. For a preference P ∈ L(A), by R we denote the weak part of P, that is, for all a, b ∈ A,
aRb if and only if
[
aPb or a = b
]
. For P ∈ L(A) and non-empty B ⊆ A, we define τ(P, B) = a if and only
if a ∈ B and aPb for all b ∈ B \ {a}. For ease of presentation, we denote τ(P, A) by τ(P).
We introduce the notion of an allocation of a (non-empty) set of objects B ⊆ A over a (non-empty) set
of individuals S ⊆ N. If |S| ≤ |B|, then an allocation assigns a unique object to each individual (some
objects will be left unassigned if |S| < |B|). More formally, an allocation in this scenario is a one-to-one
function µ : S → B. On the other hand, if |B| < |S|, then an allocation assigns each object to a unique
individual (some individuals will not be assigned any object). More formally, an allocation in this scenario
is an onto function µ : S → B ∪ {∅} such that µ−1(a) is singleton for all a ∈ B.
Here, µ(i) = a for some element a of A means individual i is assigned object a in allocation µ, and
µ(i) = ∅ means individual i is not assigned any object in µ. For S ⊆ N and B ⊆ A with |S|, |B| 6= 0, we
denote by M(S, B) the set of all allocations of B over S. For ease of presentation, we denote M(N, A) by
M.
For ease of presentation we use the following convention throughout the paper: for a set {1, . . . , g} of
integers, whenever we refer to the number g + 1, we mean 1. For instance, if we write st ≥ rt+1 for all
t = 1, . . . , g, we mean s1 ≥ r2, . . . , sg−1 ≥ rg, and sg ≥ r1.
10A strict linear order is a semiconnex, asymmetric, and transitive binary relation.
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3 Domains and their properties
Each i ∈ N has a preference Pi ∈ L(A) over A. We denote by Pi ⊆ L(A) the set of all admissible
preferences of individual i, and by PN = (P1, . . . , Pn) a n-vector of all the individuals’ preferences, which




Pi we denote the set of all admissible preference
profiles.
Given a preference profile PN , we denote by (P
′
i , P−i) the preference profile obtained from PN by chang-
ing the preference of individual i from Pi to P
′
i and keeping all other preferences unchanged.
Definition 3.1. A preference P ∈ L(A) is called single-peaked with respect to an ordering ≺∈ L(A) if
(i) for all aj, ak ∈ A with aj ≺ ak ≺ τ(P), we have akPaj, and
(ii) for all aj, ak ∈ A with τ(P) ≺ aj ≺ ak, we have ajPak.
A single-peaked preference (with respect to ≺) is called left (right) single-peaked if for all aj, ak ∈ A,
aj ≺ τ(P) ≺ ak implies ajPak (akPaj). A domain of preferences is called single-peaked (with respect to ≺)
if each preference in it is single-peaked. A single-peaked domain of preferences is called minimally rich
if it contains all left single-peaked and all right single-peaked preferences.
In the rest of the paper we assume that for all i ∈ N, Pi is a minimally rich single-peaked domain (with
respect to some (fixed) ordering ≺).
4 Assignment rules and their properties
In this section, we introduce the notion of assignment rules and discuss a few properties of those.
Definition 4.1. A function f : PN → M is called an assignment rule on PN .
For an assignment rule f : PN → M and a preference profile PN ∈ PN , we denote by fi(PN) the object
that is assigned to individual i by the assignment rule f at PN .
An allocation µ Pareto dominates another allocation ν at a preference profile PN if µ(i)Riν(i) for all
i ∈ N and µ(j)Pjν(j) for some j ∈ N.
Definition 4.2. An assignment rule f : PN → M is called Pareto efficient at a preference profile PN ∈ PN
if there is no allocation that Pareto dominates f (PN) at PN , and it is called Pareto efficient if it is Pareto
efficient at every preference profile in PN .
Remark 4.1. If an assignment rule f : PN → M satisfies Pareto efficiency, then τ(Pj) ∈ ∪
i∈N
{ fi(PN)} for
all j ∈ N. In other words, every object that is ranked at the top position by some individual must not be
left unassigned. To see this, note that if τ(Pj) /∈ ∪
i∈N
{ fi(PN)} for some j ∈ N, then the allocation µ defined
by µ(j) = τ(Pj) and µ(k) = fk(PN) for all k 6= j Pareto dominates f (PN) at PN .
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Non-bossiness is a standard notion in matching theory which says that if an individual misreports her
preference and her assignment does not change by the same, then the assignment of any other individual
cannot change.11
Definition 4.3. An assignment rule f : PN → M is non-bossy if for all PN ∈ PN , all i ∈ N, and all P̃i ∈ Pi,
fi(PN) = fi(P̃i, P−i) implies f (PN) = f (P̃i, P−i).
Definition 4.4. An assignment rule f : PN → M is strategy-proof if for all PN ∈ PN , all i ∈ N and all
P̃i ∈ Pi, we have fi(PN)Ri fi(P̃i, P−i).
Note that if an assignment rule f : PN → M is not strategy-proof, then there exist PN ∈ PN , i ∈ N and
P̃i ∈ Pi such that fi(P̃i, P−i)Pi fi(PN). In such cases, we say that the individual i manipulates f at PN via P̃i.
Definition 4.5. An assignment rule f : PN → M is group strategy-proof if for all PN ∈ PN , there do
not exist a set of individuals S ⊆ N, and a preference profile P̃S of the individuals in S such that fi(P̃S,
P−S)Ri fi(PN) for all i ∈ S and f j(P̃S, P−S)Pj f j(PN) for some j ∈ S.
Proposition 4.1. An assignment rule f : PN → M is group strategy-proof if and only if it is strategy-proof and
non-bossy.
The proof of this proposition is relegated to Appendix B.
5 An impossibility result
We introduce the notion of strongly pairwise reallocation-proof assignment rules. It says that no pair of
individuals can misreport their preferences and be better off redistributing their assignments ex post.12
Definition 5.1. An assignment rule f : PN → M is weakly manipulable through pairwise reallocation if there
exist PN ∈ PN , distinct individuals i, j ∈ N, and P̃i ∈ Pi, P̃j ∈ Pj such that
(i) f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Ri fi(PN), and
(ii) fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN).
An assignment rule is strongly pairwise reallocation-proof if it is not weakly manipulable through
pairwise reallocation.
Pápai (2000) mentions that there is no strategy-proof, non-bossy, Pareto efficient, and strongly pairwise
reallocation-proof assignment rule on the unrestricted domain, where there are at least three individuals
and three objects. Our next result says that the result holds if we restrict the domain to be minimally rich
single-peaked.
11The concept of non-bossiness is due to Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981).
12Here, we say a group of individuals is better-off if each member in it is weakly better-off and some member is strictly
better-off.
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Theorem 5.1. Suppose |N| ≥ 3 and |A| ≥ 3. Then, there does not exist a strategy-proof, non-bossy, Pareto
efficient, and strongly pairwise reallocation-proof assignment rule on PN .
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.
Since group strategy-proofness is equivalent to strategy-proofness and non-bossiness (see Proposition
4.1), we obtain the following corollary from Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.1. Suppose |N| ≥ 3 and |A| ≥ 3. Then, there does not exist a group strategy-proof, Pareto efficient,
and strongly pairwise reallocation-proof assignment rule on PN .
6 Hierarchical exchange rules
We introduce the notion of hierarchical exchange rules in this section. These rules are introduced in Pápai
(2000) and are well-known in the literature. We present a description of these rules for the sake of com-
pleteness. The description in Section 6 is taken from Mandal and Roy (2020).
We introduce some basic definitions from graph theory which we will use in defining hierarchical
exchange rules. We denote a rooted (directed) tree by T. For a tree T, we denote its set of nodes by V(T),
set of all edges by E(T), and root by r(T). For a node v ∈ V(T), we denote the set of all outgoing edges
from v by Eout(v). For an edge e ∈ E(T), we denote its source node by s(e). A path in a tree is a sequence
of nodes such that every two consecutive nodes form an edge.
First we explain the notion of a TTC procedure with respect to a given endowments of the objects over
the individuals. Suppose that each object is owned by exactly one individual. Note that an individual
may own more than one objects. A directed graph is constructed in the following manner. The set of
nodes is the same as the set of individuals. There is a directed edge from individual i to individual j if and
only if individual j owns individual i’s most preferred object. Note that such a graph will have exactly
one outgoing edge from every node (though possibly many incoming edges to a node). Further, there
may be an edge from a node to itself. It is clear that such a graph will always have a cycle. This cycle is
called a top trading cycle (TTC). After forming a TTC, the individuals in the TTC are assigned their most
preferred objects.
6.1 Verbal description of hierarchical exchange rules
The following verbal description of hierarchical exchange rules is taken from Pápai (2000). The allocation
obtained by a hierarchical exchange rule can be described by the following iterative procedure. Individ-
uals have an initial individual “endowment“ of objects such that each object is exactly one individual’s
endowment. It is important to note that some individuals may not be endowed with any objects. Now
apply the TTC procedure to this market with individual endowments. Notice that individuals who don’t
have endowments cannot be part of a top trading cycle, since nobody points to them, and therefore they
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need not point. Given that multiple endowments are allowed, after the individuals in top trading cycles
leave the market with their most preferred objects, unassigned objects in the initial endowment sets of
individuals who received their assignment may be left behind. These objects are reassigned as endow-
ments to individuals who are still in the market, that is, they are “inherited“ by individuals who have
not yet received their assignments. Furthermore, the objects in the initial endowment sets of individuals
who are still in the market remain the individual endowments of these individuals. Thus, notice that each
unassigned object is the endowment of exactly one individual who is still in the market. Now apply the
TTC procedure to this reduced market with the new endowments.13 Repeat this procedure until every
individual has her assignment or all the objects are assigned. Since there exists at least one top trading
cycle in every stage, this procedure leads to an allocation of the objects in a finite number of stages. In par-
ticular, there are at most as many stages as there are individuals or objects, whichever number is smaller,
since in each stage at least one person receives her assignment. Furthermore, for any strict preferences of
the individuals, the resulting allocation is unique.
A hierarchical exchange rule is determined by the initial endowments and the hierarchical endowment
inheritance in later stages. While the initial endowment sets are given a priori, the hierarchical endow-
ment inheritance may be endogenous. In particular, the inheritance of endowments may depend on the
assignments made in earlier stages.
We explain how a hierarchical exchange rule works by means of the following example.
Example 6.1. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a1, a2, a3, a4} with a prior order a1 ≺ a2 ≺ a3 ≺ a4. A
hierarchical exchange rule is based on a collection of inheritance trees, one tree for each object. We will
define this notion formally; for the time being we explain it through the current example. Figure 6.1
presents a collection of inheritance trees Γa1 , . . . , Γa4 . To understand their structure, let us look at one of
them, say Γa1 . Each maximal path of this tree has min{|N|, |A|} − 1 = 2 edges. In any maximal path,
each individual appears at most once at the nodes. For instance, individuals 1, 2 and 3 appear at the nodes
(in that order) in the left most path of Γa1 . Each object other than a1 appears exactly once at the outgoing
edges from the root (thus there are three edges from the root). For every subsequent node which is not
the end node of a maximal path, each object other than a1, that has not already appeared in the path from
the root to that node, appears exactly once at the outgoing edges from that node. For instance, consider
the node marked with 2 in the left most path of Γa1 . Since this node is not the end node of the left most
maximal path and object a2 has already appeared at the edge from the root to this node, objects a3 and a4
appear exactly once at the outgoing edges from this node. Thus, each object other than a1 appears at most
once at the edges in any maximal path of Γa1 . For instance, objects a2 and a3 appear at the edges (in that
order) in the left most path of Γa1 . It can be verified that other inheritance trees have the same structure.



















































































Figure 6.1: Inheritance trees for Example 6.1
Consider the hierarchical exchange rule based on the collection of inheritance trees given in Figure 6.1.
We explain how to compute the outcome of the rule at a given preference profile. Consider the preference






Table 6.1: Preference profile for Example 6.1
The outcome is computed through a number of stages. In each stage, endowments of the individuals
are determined by means of the inheritance trees and TTC procedure is performed with respect to the
endowments.
Stage 1.
In Stage 1, the “owner“ of an object a is the individual who is assigned to the root-node of the inheri-
tance tree Γa. Thus, object a1 is owned by individual 1, objects a2 and a3 are owned by individual 2, and
object a4 is owned by individual 3.
Once the endowments of the individuals are decided, TTC procedure is performed with respect to the
endowments to decide the outcome of Stage 1. Individuals who are assigned some object in Stage 1 leave
the market with the corresponding objects. It can be verified that for the preference profile PN given in
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Table 6.1, individual 1 gets object a2 and individual 2 gets object a1 at the outcome of TTC procedure in
this stage. So, individuals 1 and 2 leave the market with objects a2 and a1, respectively.
Stage 2.
As in Stage 1, the endowments of the individuals are decided first and then TTC procedure is per-
formed with respect to the endowments. To decide the owner of a (remaining) object a, look at the root of
the inheritance tree Γa. If the individual who appears there, say individual i, is remained in the market,
then i becomes the owner of a. Otherwise, that is, if i is assigned an object in Stage 1, say b, then follow
the edge from the root that is marked with b. If the individual appearing at the node following this edge,
say j, is remained in the market, then j becomes the owner of a. Otherwise, that is, if j is assigned an
object in Stage 1, say c, then follow the edge that is marked with c from the current node. As before, check
whether the individual appearing at the end of this edge is remained in the market or not. Continue in
this manner until an individual is found in the particular path who is not already assigned an object and
decide that individual as the owner of a.
For the example at hand, the remaining market in Stage 2 consists of objects a3 and a4, and individual 3.
Consider object a3. Individual 2 appears at the root of Γa3 . Since individual 2 is assigned object a1 in Stage
1, we follow the edge from the root that is marked with a1 and come to individual 1. Since individual 1
is assigned object a2, we follow the edge marked with a2 from this node and come to individual 3. Since
individual 3 is remained in the market, she becomes the owner of a3. For object a4, individual 3 appears
at the root of Γa4 and she is remained in the market. So, individual 3 becomes the owner of a4 in Stage 2.
To emphasize the process of deciding the owner of an object, we have highlighted the node in red in the









































Figure 6.2: Stage 2
Once the endowments are decided for Stage 2, TTC procedure is performed with respect to the en-
dowments to decide the outcome of this stage. As in Stage 1, individuals who are assigned some object in
Stage 2 leave the market with the corresponding objects. It can be verified that for the current example,
individual 3 gets object a3 in this stage. So, individual 3 leave the market with objects a3.
Stage 3 is followed on the remaining market in a similar way as Stage 2. For the current example,
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everybody is assigned some object by the end of Stage 2 and hence the algorithm stops in this stage.
Thus, individuals 1, 2, and 3 get objects a2, a1, and a3, respectively, at the outcome of the hierarchical
exchange rule.
6.2 Formal definition of hierarchical exchange rules
In what follows, we present a formal description of hierarchical exchange rules.
6.2.1 Inheritance trees
For a rooted tree T, the level of a node v ∈ V(T) is defined as the number of edges appearing in the
(unique) path from r(T) to v.




(i) Ta is a rooted tree with
(a) max
v∈V(Ta)
level(v) = min{|N|, |A|} − 1, and
(b) |Eout(v)| = |A| − level(v)− 1 for all v ∈ V(Ta) with level(v) < min{|N|, |A|} − 1,
(ii) ζNIa : V(Ta) → N is a nodes-to-individuals function with ζ
NI
a (v) 6= ζ
NI
a (ṽ) for all distinct v, ṽ ∈
V(Ta) that appear in same path, and
(iii) ζEOa : E(Ta) → A \ {a} is an edges-to-objects function with ζ
EO
a (e) 6= ζ
EO
a (ẽ) for all distinct e,
ẽ ∈ E(Ta) that appear in same path or have same source node (that is, s(e) = s(ẽ)).
In what follows, we provide two examples (for two different scenarios) of inheritance trees.
Example 6.2. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a1, a2, a3, a4} with a prior order a1 ≺ a2 ≺ a3 ≺ a4.
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Figure 6.3: Example of Γa1
Example 6.3. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and A = {a1, a2, a3} with a prior order a1 ≺ a2 ≺ a3. Figure 6.4
presents another example of Γa1 .











Figure 6.4: Example of Γa1
6.2.2 Endowments
A hierarchical exchange rule works in several stages and in each stage, endowments of individuals are
determined by using a (fixed) collection of inheritance trees.
Given a collection of inheritance trees Γ = (Γa)a∈A, one for each object a ∈ A, we define a class of
endowments EΓ as follows:
(i) The initial endowment EΓi (∅) of individual i is given by
EΓi (∅) = {a ∈ A | ζ
NI
a (r(Ta)) = i}.
(ii) For all S ⊆ N \ {i} and B ⊆ A with |S| = |B| 6= 0, and all µ̂ ∈ M(S, B), the endowment EΓi (µ̂) of
individual i is given by
EΓi (µ̂) ={a ∈ A \ B | ζ
NI
a (r(Ta)) = i, or
there exists a path (v1a, . . . , v
ra
a ) from r(Ta) to v
ra




a ) = i















6.2.3 Iterative procedure to compute the outcome of a hierarchical exchange rule
For a given collection of inheritance trees Γ = (Γa)a∈A, the hierarchical exchange rule f
Γ associated with
Γ is defined by an iterative procedure with at most min{|N|, |A|} number of stages. Consider a preference
profile PN ∈ PN .
Stage 1.
Hierarchical Endowments (Initial Endowments): For all i ∈ N, E1(i, PN) = E
Γ
i (∅).
Top Choices: For all i ∈ N, T1(i, PN) = τ(Pi).
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{j1, . . . , jg} if there exist j1, . . . , jg ∈ N such that
for all s = 1, . . . , g, T1(js, PN) ∈ E1(js+1, PN), and
for some ŝ = 1, . . . , g, jŝ = i;
∅ otherwise.
Since each individual can be in at most one trading cycle, C1(i, PN) is well-defined for all i ∈ N.
Furthermore, since both the number of individuals and the number of objects are finite, there is always at
least one trading cycle. Note that C1(i, PN) = {i} if T1(i, PN) ∈ E1(i, PN).
Assigned Individuals: W1(PN) = {i | C1(i, PN) 6= ∅}.
Assignments: For all i ∈ W1(PN), f
Γ
i (PN) = T1(i, PN).
Assigned Objects: F1(PN) = {T1(i, PN) | i ∈ W1(PN)}.










Fu(PN). In what follows, we present Stage t + 1 of f
Γ.
...
Stage t + 1.
Hierarchical Endowments (Non-initial Endowments): Let µt ∈ M(Wt(PN), F
t(PN)) such that for all i ∈
Wt(PN),
µt(i) = f Γi (PN).




Top Choices: For all i ∈ N \ Wt(PN), Tt+1(i, PN) = τ(Pi, A \ F
t(PN)).























{j1, . . . , jg} if there exist j1, . . . , jg ∈ N \ W
t(PN) such that
for all s = 1, . . . , g, Tt+1(js, PN) ∈ Et+1(js+1, PN), and
for some ŝ = 1, . . . , g, jŝ = i;
∅ otherwise.
Assigned Individuals: Wt+1(PN) = {i | Ct+1(i, PN) 6= ∅}.
Assignments: For all i ∈ Wt+1(PN), f
Γ
i (PN) = Tt+1(i, PN).
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Assigned Objects: Ft+1(PN) = {Tt+1(i, PN) | i ∈ Wt+1(PN)}.
...
This procedure is repeated iteratively until either all individuals are assigned or all objects are assigned.
The hierarchical exchange rule f Γ associated with Γ is defined as follows. For all i ∈ N,






Tt(i, PN) if i ∈ Wt(PN) for some stage t;
∅ otherwise.
Since for every preference profile PN and every individual i, there exists at most one stage t such that
i ∈ Wt(PN), f
Γ is well-defined.
Remark 6.1. Note that a collection of inheritance trees do not uniquely identify a hierarchical exchange
rule. More formally, two different collections of inheritance trees Γ and Γ may give rise to the same
hierarchical exchange rule, that is, f Γ ≡ f Γ.
7 A characterization of hierarchical exchange rules
We introduce the notion of top-envy-proofness for an assignment rule. It says that if an individual i is
assigned the most preferred object of another individual j, then no matter how the individual j misreports
her preference, individual i cannot be worse-off. Thus, if an individual (here, j) is envious at another
individual (here, i) for getting her (here, j’s) top-ranked object, then the former one can never harm the
latter. As the name suggests, top-envy-proofness is weaker than envy-proofness (that is, envy-proofness
implies top-envy-proofness).15 Loosely speaking, top-envy-proofness can be viewed as envy-proofness
with respect to the top-ranked object of the envious individual.
Definition 7.1. An assignment rule f : PN → M satisfies top-envy-proofness condition if for all PN ∈ PN
and all distinct i, j ∈ N, τ(Pj) = fi(PN) implies fi(P̃j, P−j)Ri fi(PN) for all P̃j ∈ Pj.
Next, we introduce the notion of an assignment rule being manipulable through pairwise reallocation. It
captures the idea of manipulation where two individuals simultaneously misreport their preferences and
finally benefit (with respect to their original assignments) by reshuffling their assignments that they obtain
at the misreported preference profile. It further says that if any one of the two individuals misreports her
preference as “planned”, then her assignment will not depend whether the other individual misreports
her preference as planned or reports truthfully.
15An assignment rule f : PN → M satisfies envy-proofness condition if for all PN ∈ PN and all distinct i, j ∈ N,
fi(PN)Pj f j(PN) implies fi(P̃j, P−j)Ri fi(PN) for all P̃j ∈ Pj.
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Definition 7.2. An assignment rule f : PN → M is manipulable through pairwise reallocation if there exist
PN ∈ PN , individuals i, j ∈ N; i 6= j, and P̃i ∈ Pi, P̃j ∈ Pj such that
(i) f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Ri fi(PN),
(ii) fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN), and
(iii) fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = fi(P̃i, Pj, P−i,j) and f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = f j(Pi, P̃j, P−i,j).
An assignment rule is pairwise reallocation-proof if it is not manipulable through pairwise realloca-
tion.
Our next result provides a characterization of hierarchical exchange rules.
Theorem 7.1. An assignment rule f : PN → M is strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, top-envy-proof, non-bossy,
and pairwise reallocation-proof if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix D.
Since group strategy-proofness is equivalent to strategy-proofness and non-bossiness (see Proposition
4.1), we obtain the following corollary from Theorem 7.1.
Corollary 7.1. An assignment rule f : PN → M is group strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, top-envy-proof, and
pairwise reallocation-proof if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule.
We now strengthen the notion of pairwise reallocation-proof by group-wise reallocation-proof. As the
name suggests, instead of a pair of individuals, arbitrary groups of individuals are considered in group-
wise reallocation-proof. Thus, group-wise reallocation-proof ensures that no group of individuals can be
better off by misreporting their preferences and redistributing the objects they obtain at the misreported
preference profile. Condition (iii) in Definition 7.2 is suitably modified for group of individuals.
To ease our presentation, for an assignment rule f , a preference profile PN , and a set of individuals S,
we denote by fS(PN) the allocation over S according to f (PN). More formally, fS(PN) is the allocation µ
over S such that µ(i) = fi(PN) for all i ∈ S. With slight abuse of notation, by { fS(PN)} we denote the
set of objects which are assigned to the individuals in S at PN , that is, { fS(PN)} := {a ∈ A | fi(PN) =
a for some i ∈ S}.
Definition 7.3. An assignment rule f : PN → M is manipulable through group-wise reallocation if there exist
PN ∈ PN , a set of individuals S ⊆ N, a preference profile P̃S of the individuals in S, and an allocation µ̂ of
{ fS(P̃S, P−S)} over S where µ̂ 6= fS(P̃S, P−S) such that
(i) µ̂(i)Ri fi(PN) for all i ∈ S,
(ii) µ̂(j)Pj f j(PN) for some j ∈ S, and
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(iii) fi(P̃i, P̃S\{i}, P−S) = fi(P̃i, PS\{i}, P−S) for all i ∈ S.
An assignment rule is group-wise reallocation-proof if it is not manipulable through group-wise real-
location.
Proposition 7.1. Every hierarchical exchange rule satisfies group-wise reallocation-proofness.
The proof of this proposition is relegated to Appendix E.
We obtain the following corollary from Theorem 7.1 and Proposition 7.1.
Corollary 7.2. An assignment rule f : PN → M is strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, top-envy-proof, non-bossy,
and group-wise reallocation-proof if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule.
The next corollary is obtained by combining Corollary 7.1 and Proposition 7.1.
Corollary 7.3. An assignment rule f : PN → M is group strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, top-envy-proof, and
group-wise reallocation-proof if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule.
8 Independence of the conditions in Theorem 7.1
In this section, we show that strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, top-envy-proofness, non-bossiness and
pairwise reallocation-proofness are all independent for a hierarchical exchange rule. In particular, we
show that no four of those conditions imply the fifth one.
Example 8.1. In this example, we show that Pareto efficiency, top-envy-proofness, non-bossiness, and
pairwise reallocation-proofness do not imply strategy-proofness. Consider an allocation problem with
three individuals N = {1, 2, 3} and three objects A = {a1, a2, a3} with a prior order a1 ≺ a2 ≺ a3.







Serial dictatorship with priority (1 ≻ 3 ≻ 2) if τ(P1) = τ(P2) = a1, and τ(P3) = a2;
Serial dictatorship with priority (1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3) otherwise.
Consider the preference profiles PN = (a1a2a3, a1a2a3, a2a1a3) and P̃N = (a1a2a3, a2a1a3, a2a1a3).
16 Note
that only individual 2 changes her preference from PN to P̃N . This, together with the facts f2(PN) = a3,
f2(P̃N) = a2, and a2P2a3, implies f is not strategy-proof. It can be easily verified that f is Pareto efficient,
top-envy-proof, non-bossy, and pairwise reallocation-proof.
Example 8.2. In this example, we show that strategy-proofness, top-envy-proofness, non-bossiness, and
pairwise reallocation-proofness do not imply Pareto efficiency. Define f such that fi(PN) = ∅ for all i ∈ N
and all PN . It is easy to verify that f satisfies strategy-proofness, top-envy-proofness, non-bossiness,
and pairwise reallocation-proofness. However, from Remark 4.1, it follows that f does not satisfy Pareto
efficiency.
16Here, we denote by (a1a2a3, a2a3a1, a3a2a1) a preference profile where individuals 1, 2 and 3 have preferences a1a2a3, a2a3a1,
and a3a2a1, respectively.
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Example 8.3. In this example, we show that strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, and pair-
wise reallocation-proofness do not imply top-envy-proofness condition. Consider an allocation problem
with three individuals N = {1, 2, 3} and four objects A = {a1, a2, a3, a4} with a prior order a1 ≺ a2 ≺ a3 ≺







Serial dictatorship with priority (2 ≻ 1 ≻ 3) if τ(P1) = τ(P2) = a1, and τ(P3) = a4;
Serial dictatorship with priority (1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3) otherwise.
Consider the preference profiles PN = (a1a2a3a4, a1a2a3a4, a1a2a3a4) and P̃N = (a1a2a3a4, a1a2a3a4,
a4a3a2a1). Note that only individual 3 changes her preference from PN to P̃N . This, together with the
facts f1(PN) = a1, τ(P3) = a1, f1(P̃N) = a2, and a1P1a2, implies f is not top-envy-proof. It can be easily
verified that f is strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, non-bossy, and pairwise reallocation-proof.
Example 8.4. In this example, we show that strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, top-envy-proofness, and
pairwise reallocation-proofness do not imply non-bossiness. Consider an allocation problem with three
individuals N = {1, 2, 3} and three objects A = {a1, a2, a3} with a prior order a1 ≺ a2 ≺ a3. Consider the







Serial dictatorship with priority (1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3) if a1P1a3;
Serial dictatorship with priority (1 ≻ 3 ≻ 2) if a3P1a1.
Consider the preference profiles PN = (a2a1a3, a2a1a3, a2a1a3) and P̃N = (a2a3a1, a2a1a3, a2a1a3). Note
that only individual 1 changes her preference from PN to P̃N . This, together with the facts f (PN) = [(1,
a2), (2, a1), (3, a3)] and f (P̃N) = [(1, a2), (2, a3), (3, a1)], implies f is not non-bossy. It is easy to verify that
f is strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, top-envy-proof, and pairwise reallocation-proof.
Example 8.5. In this example, we show that strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, top-envy-proofness, and
non-bossiness do not imply pairwise reallocation-proofness. Consider an allocation problem with three
individuals N = {1, 2, 3} and three objects A = {a1, a2, a3} with a prior order a1 ≺ a2 ≺ a3. Consider the
hierarchical exchange rule f Γ based on the collection of inheritance trees given in Figure 8.1. Consider the







Serial dictatorship with priority (2 ≻ 1 ≻ 3) if τ(P1) = τ(P2) = a3, and τ(P3) = a1;
f Γ otherwise.
Consider the preference profile PN = (a3a2a1, a3a2a1, a1a2a3) and the preferences P̃1 ∈ P1, P̃3 ∈ P3 such
that τ(P̃1) = a1 and τ(P̃3) = a3. It follows from the construction of f that f (PN) = [(1, a2), (2, a3), (3,
a1)], f1(P̃1, P2, P̃3) = f1(P̃1, P2, P3) = a1, f3(P̃1, P2, P̃3) = f3(P1, P2, P̃3) = a3. These facts, along with the fact
a3P1a2, together imply f is not pairwise reallocation-proof. It can be easily verified that f is strategy-proof,
































Figure 8.1: Inheritance trees for Example 8.5
Remark 8.1. The examples in this section also demonstrate that strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, top-
envy-proofness, non-bossiness, and group-wise reallocation-proofness are all independent for a hierarchi-
cal exchange rule. To see this note that except for Example 8.2, all other examples deal with three individ-
uals, and Pareto efficiency and pairwise reallocation-proofness together imply group-wise reallocation-
proofness in such cases. The fact that the assignment rule in Example 8.2 satisfies group-wise reallocation-
proofness is straightforward, and the assignment rule in Example 8.5 is not pairwise reallocation-proof
(while being strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, top-envy-proof, and non-bossy), so it will not be group-wise
reallocation-proof either.
Appendix A Preliminaries
For a, b ∈ A, let P(a;b) be a single-peaked preference (with respect to the given ordering ≺) such that
(i) τ(P(a;b)) = a, and
(ii) P(a;b) is a left (right) single-peaked preference if b  a (a ≺ b).17
Remark A.1. Since Pi is minimally rich single-peaked domain of preferences (with respect to the given
ordering ≺) for all i ∈ N, we have P(a;b) ∈ Pi for all i ∈ N and all a, b ∈ A.
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof of Proposition 4.1. (If part) Assume for contradiction that f is not group strategy-proof. Since f is




Pi such that fi(P
′
S, P−S)Ri fi(PN) for
all i ∈ S and f j(P
′
S, P−S)Pj f j(PN) for some j ∈ S. Consider the profile of preferences P̃S ∈ ∏
i∈S
Pi such that









S,P−S); fi(PN)) if fi(PN) 6= ∅;
P′i if fi(PN) = ∅.
It follows from the construction of P̃S and Remark A.1 that P̃S is well-defined.
17By  we denote the weak part of ≺, that is, for all a, b ∈ A, a  b if and only if
[




First, we show that f (P̃S, P−S) = f (PN). Fix j ∈ S.
Claim B.1. f (P̃j, P−j) = f (PN).
Proof of Claim B.1. Suppose f j(PN) = ∅. Then, by strategy-proofness, we have f j(P̃j, P−j) = ∅. Since
f j(PN) = ∅ and f j(P̃j, P−j) = ∅, by non-bossiness, we have
f (P̃j, P−j) = f (PN). (B.1)
Now, suppose f j(PN) 6= ∅. Then, by strategy-proofness, we have f j(P̃j, P−j)R̃j f j(PN). Suppose f j(P̃j,
P−j)P̃j f j(PN). Since f j(P̃j, P−j)P̃j f j(PN), it follows from the construction of P̃j that
f j(P
′
S, P−S) 6= f j(PN), and (B.2a)
f j(P
′





S, P−S)Ri fi(PN) for all i ∈ S, by (B.2a) we have f j(P
′
S, P−S)Pj f j(PN). This, together with (B.2b),
implies f j(P̃j, P−j)Pj f j(PN), a contradiction to strategy-proofness. So, it must be that f j(P̃j, P−j) = f j(PN).
By non-bossiness, the fact f j(P̃j, P−j) = f j(PN) implies
f (P̃j, P−j) = f (PN). (B.3)
(B.1) and (B.3) together complete the proof of Claim B.1. 
Continuing in this manner, we can move the preferences of all individuals j ∈ S, from the preference
Pj to P̃j one by one and obtain
f (P̃S, P−S) = f (PN). (B.4)
Next, we show that f (P̃S, P−S) = f (P
′










j . This, together with the fact f j(P̃j, P
′
S\{j}, P−S)R̃j f j(P
′
S, P−S), implies f j(P̃j, P
′
S\{j}, P−S) = f j(P
′
S,
P−S). By non-bossiness, the fact f j(P̃j, P
′





S\{j}, P−S) = f (P
′
S, P−S).
Continuing in this manner, we can move the preferences of all individuals j ∈ S, from the preference P′j
to P̃j one by one and obtain
f (P̃S, P−S) = f (P
′
S, P−S). (B.5)
However, (B.4) and (B.5) together imply f (P′S, P−S) = f (PN), a contradiction to the fact that f j(P
′
S,
P−S)Pj f j(PN) for some j ∈ S. This completes the proof of the “if“ part of Proposition 4.1.
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(Only-if part) It is obvious that group strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness and non-bossiness.
Appendix C Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Suppose A = {a1, a2, . . . , am} with a prior order a1 ≺ a2 ≺ · · · ≺ am, where m ≥
3. Assume for contradiction that there exists a strategy-proof, non-bossy, Pareto efficient, and strongly
pairwise reallocation-proof assignment rule f on PN . Since Pi is minimally rich for all i ∈ N, there exists
a preference profile P1N ∈ PN such that P
1
i = a2a1a3 . . . for all i ∈ N. Since |N| ≥ 3, by Pareto efficiency,




N)}. Without loss of generality, assume f1(P
1
N) = a1, f2(P
1
N) = a2, and
f3(P1N) = a3.
Since Pi is minimally rich for all i ∈ N, we can construct the preference profiles presented in Table C.1.
Here, l denotes an individual other than 1, 2, 3 (if any). Note that such an individual does not change her
preference across the mentioned preference profiles.
Preference profiles Individual 1 Individual 2 Individual 3 . . . Individual l
P2N a2 . . . ama1 a1a2a3 . . . a2a1a3 . . . . . . a2a1a3 . . .
P3N a2 . . . ama1 a2a1a3 . . . a2a1a3 . . . . . . a2a1a3 . . .
Table C.1: Preference profiles for Theorem 5.1
Since f1(P
1
N) = a1 and f2(P
1
N) = a2, it follows from strong pairwise reallocation-proofness of f that
f1(P
2
N) = a2 and f2(P
2
N) = a1. (C.1)
By (C.1) we have f2(P2N) = a1. This, together with strategy-proofness of f , implies f2(P
3
N) ∈ {a1,
a2}. Suppose f2(P3N) = a1. Since f2(P
2
N) = a1 and f2(P
3
N) = a1, by non-bossiness and (C.1), we have
f1(P
3
N) = a2. However, since a2P
1
1 a1, the facts f1(P
1
N) = a1 and f1(P
3
N) = a2 together contradict strategy-
proofness of f . So, it must be that
f2(P
3
N) = a2. (C.2)
Since f1(P
1
N) = a1 and f3(P
1




N) = a3, f2(P
3
N) = a2, and f3(P
3
N) = a1. (C.3)
By (C.3) we have f2(P3N) = a2 and f3(P
3
N) = a1. Combining these facts with strong pairwise reallocation-
proofness of f , we have f2(P2N) = a1 and f3(P
2
N) = a2. However, the fact that f3(P
2
N) = a2 contradicts
(C.1). This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
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Appendix D Proof of Theorem 7.1
To prove Theorem 7.1, we use the notations introduced in Section 6. Furthermore, for a preference profile
PN ∈ PN and a hierarchical exchange rule, we assume F
0(PN) = ∅ and W
0(PN) = ∅.
The following lemma is taken from Pápai (2000). She proves this lemma for the unrestricted domain.
Since PN is a subset of the unrestricted domain, the result holds for PN as well.
Lemma D.1 (Lemma 4 in Pápai (2000)). Let f Γ be a hierarchical exchange rule, PN ∈ PN , and i, j ∈ N. Suppose
i ∈ Ws(PN) and f
Γ
j (PN) 6= f
Γ
j (P̃i, P−i) for some P̃i ∈ Pi. Then, either j ∈ Cs(i, PN) or j /∈ W
s(PN).
We obtain the following lemma from Lemma D.1.
Lemma D.2. Let f Γ be a hierarchical exchange rule and PN ∈ PN . Suppose i ∈ Wsi(PN), j ∈ Wsj(PN) and
si < sj. Then, f
Γ
i (P̄j, P−j) = f
Γ
i (PN) for all P̄j ∈ Pj.
Lemma D.3 establishes a property which says that if an individual j prefers the assignment of another
individual i of a hierarchical exchange rule, then it must be that i is assigned before j.
Lemma D.3. Let f Γ be a hierarchical exchange rule and PN ∈ PN . Suppose i ∈ Wsi(PN) and j ∈ Wsj(PN) such
that f Γi (PN)Pj f
Γ
j (PN). Then, si < sj.
Proof of Lemma D.3. Assume for contradiction that sj ≤ si. Since j ∈ Wsj(PN), by the definition of f
Γ, we
have f Γj (PN) = τ(Pj, A \ F
sj−1(PN)). Furthermore, the fact i ∈ Wsi(PN) together with the definition of f
Γ,
implies that f Γi (PN) ∈ A \ F
si−1(PN). This, together with the fact sj ≤ si, yields f
Γ
i (PN) ∈ A \ F
sj−1(PN).
However, the facts that f Γj (PN) = τ(Pj, A \ F
sj−1(PN)) and f
Γ
i (PN) ∈ A \ F
sj−1(PN) together contradict the
fact f Γi (PN)Pj f
Γ
j (PN). This completes the proof of Lemma D.3. 
D.1 Proof of the “if“ part of Theorem 7.1
It follows from Pápai (2000) that every hierarchical exchange rule satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto effi-
ciency, top-envy-proofness, and non-bossiness on the unrestricted domain.18 Since PN is a subset of the
unrestricted domain, it follows that every hierarchical exchange rule satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto
efficiency, top-envy-proofness, and non-bossiness on PN . In what follows, we show that every hierarchi-
cal exchange rule satisfies pairwise reallocation-proofness on PN .
Let f Γ be a hierarchical exchange rule on PN . Assume for contradiction that f
Γ does not satisfy pair-
wise reallocation-proofness. Then, there must exists PN ∈ PN , distinct i, j ∈ N, and P̃i ∈ Pi, P̃j ∈ Pj such
that
(i) f Γj (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Ri f
Γ
i (PN),
(ii) f Γi (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f
Γ
j (PN), and
18For details see Lemma 1, Lemma 7, and the main theorem of Pápai (2000).
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(iii) f Γi (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = f
Γ
i (P̃i, P−i) and f
Γ
j (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = f
Γ
j (P̃j, P−j).
Claim D.1. f Γi (PN) and f
Γ
j (PN) are distinct objects.
Proof of Claim D.1. Suppose f Γi (PN) = ∅. Since f
Γ is strategy-proof, f Γi (PN) = ∅ implies f
Γ
i (P̃i, P−i) = ∅.
However, the facts that f Γi (P̃i, P−i) = ∅ and f
Γ
i (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = f
Γ
i (P̃i, P−i) together imply f
Γ
i (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) =
∅, a contradiction to the fact f Γi (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f
Γ
j (P). So, it must be that
f Γi (PN) 6= ∅. (D.1)
Since f Γj (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Ri f
Γ
i (PN), (D.1) implies f
Γ





j (P̃j, P−j), implies f
Γ
j (P̃j, P−j) 6= ∅. Since f
Γ is strategy-proof, f Γj (P̃j, P−j) 6= ∅ implies
f Γj (PN) 6= ∅. (D.2)
(D.1) and (D.2) together complete the proof of Claim D.1. 
It follows from Claim D.1 that there exist stages si and sj of f
Γ at PN such that i ∈ Wsi(PN) and j ∈
Wsj(PN). Now, we complete the proof by distinguishing two cases.
CASE 1: Suppose sj ≤ si.
Since f Γ is Pareto efficient, f Γi (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f
Γ
j (PN) implies that there exists k ∈ N \ {j} such that
f Γk (PN) = f
Γ
i (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). The facts f
Γ
i (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f
Γ
j (PN) and f
Γ
k (PN) = f
Γ
i (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) together imply
f Γk (PN)Pj f
Γ
j (PN) and f
Γ
k (PN) ∈ A. It follows from the fact f
Γ
k (PN) ∈ A that there exists a stage sk of f
Γ at




j (PN), by Lemma D.3, we have
sk < sj. This, together with the fact sj ≤ si, implies sk < si. Since i ∈ Wsi(PN), k ∈ Wsk(PN), and sk < si, by
Lemma D.2, we have
f Γk (PN) = f
Γ
k (P̃i, P−i). (D.3)
Furthermore, the facts i ∈ Wsi(PN), k ∈ Wsk(PN), and sk < si together imply i 6= k. Since f
Γ
k (PN) ∈ A and
i 6= k, (D.3) implies
f Γk (PN) 6= f
Γ
i (P̃i, P−i). (D.4)
However, the facts f Γi (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = f
Γ
i (P̃i, P−i) and f
Γ
k (PN) = f
Γ
i (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) together contradict (D.4).
CASE 2: Suppose si < sj.
If f Γj (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pi f
Γ





i (PN), let us assume




Since i ∈ Wsi(PN), j ∈ Wsj(PN), and si < sj, by Lemma D.2, we have
f Γi (P̃j, P−j) = f
Γ
i (PN). (D.6)
Furthermore, since f Γj (P̃j, P−j) = f
Γ
j (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j), by (D.5) and (D.6), we have
f Γi (P̃j, P−j) = f
Γ
j (P̃j, P−j) = f
Γ
i (PN). (D.7)
However, by Claim D.1, we have f Γi (PN) ∈ A. Since f
Γ
i (PN) ∈ A and i 6= j, (D.7) implies that f
Γ(P̃j,
P−j) is not an allocation, a contradiction.
Since Cases 1 and 2 are exhaustive, it follows that f Γ satisfies pairwise reallocation-proofness on PN .
D.2 Proof of the “only-if“ part of Theorem 7.1
Let f be a strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, top-envy-proof, non-bossy, and pairwise reallocation-proof
assignment rule. We will show that f is a hierarchical exchange rule.
D.2.1 Construction of the inheritance trees based on f
Fix a ∈ A. We proceed to construct an inheritance tree Γa = 〈Ta, ζNIa , ζ
EO
a 〉 for a ∈ A. Let Ta be a rooted tree
that satisfies Condition (i) of Definition 6.1. Let ζEOa : E(Ta) → A \ {a} be an edges-to-objects function
that satisfies Condition (iii) of Definition 6.1. We will define ζNIa : V(Ta) → N, a nodes-to-individuals
function, in accordance with property Condition (ii) of Definition 6.1 based on f .
Let P0N ⊆ PN be the set of all preference profiles PN such that τ(Pi) = a for all i ∈ N.
Lemma D.4. There exists k ∈ N such that fk(PN) = a for all PN ∈ P
0
N .
Proof of Lemma D.4. By Remark 4.1, for every given PN ∈ P
0
N , there exists an individual k ∈ N such
that fk(PN) = a. It remains to show that this individual is unique for all preference profile in P
0
N , that is,
fk(PN) = fk(P
′




N . Assume for contradiction that f j(PN) = f j′(P
′





N and j, j
′ ∈ N such that j 6= j′.
Since f j(PN) = a, τ(Pj) = a, and aPk fk(PN) for all k 6= j, by moving the preferences of the individuals
k 6= j one by one from Pk to P
′
k, and by applying top-envy-proofness condition every time, we obtain
f j(Pj, P
′
−j) = a. Moreover, since f j′(P
′
N) = a and j 6= j
′, we have f j(P
′
N) 6= a. This, together with the




N). However, the facts f j(Pj, P
′





strategy-proofness of f . This completes the proof of Lemma D.4. 
By Lemma D.4, there exists i1 ∈ N such that fi1(PN) = a for all PN ∈ P
0




a) = i1 where
v1a is the root-node of Ta. Let (v
1
a, . . . , v
r




a in Ta. We define ζ
NI
a on
{vsa | 1 ≤ s ≤ r} in a recursive manner.
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Assume that ζNIa is defined on {v
s




a) = is for all s = 1, . . . , r − 1. We proceed










for all s = 1, . . . , r − 1, and τ(Pi) = a otherwise. Note that for all PN ∈ P
r−1
N and all s, s
′ ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1},
τ(Pis) 6= τ(Pis′ ) if s 6= s
′.
Lemma D.5. There exists k ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , ir−1} such that fk(PN) = a for all PN ∈ P
r−1
N .
Proof of Lemma D.5. We first prove two claims that we will use to complete the proof of Lemma D.5.
Claim D.2. Let S = {h1, . . . , hm} ( N be a set of distinct individuals with m < |A| and let {b1, . . . , bm} ∈
A \ {a} be a set of distinct objects. Consider the preference profile PN such that τ(Phu) = bu for all u = 1, . . . , m
and τ(Pi) = a for all i /∈ S. Then, there exists j ∈ N \ S such that f j(PN) = a.
Proof of Claim D.2. By Remark 4.1, for all c ∈ {a, b1, . . . , bm}, there exists jc ∈ N such that f jc(PN) = c. It
remains to show ja /∈ S. Assume for contradiction that ja ∈ S. Let {j1, . . . , jt−1} ⊆ S and jt /∈ S be such that
j1 = ja, f js+1(PN) = τ(Pjs) for all 1 ≤ s ≤ t − 1. Since S is finite, to show such a sequence must exist, it is
sufficient to show that j1, . . . , jt−1 are all distinct. We show this in what follows. Assume for contradiction
that l is the first index in the ordering 1, . . . , t − 1 for which there exists l < l′ ≤ t − 1 such that jl = jl′ .
Suppose l = 1. The facts l = 1, jl = jl′ , j1 = ja, f ja(PN) = a and f jl′ (PN) = τ(Pjl′−1) together imply
τ(Pjl′−1) = a. This is a contradiction since jl′−1 ∈ S, which in particular means τ(Pjl′−1) ∈ {b1, . . . , bm}.
Now, suppose l > 1. Then jl = jl′ , f jl (PN) = τ(Pjl−1) and f jl′ (PN) = τ(Pjl′−1) together imply
τ(Pjl−1) = τ(Pjl′−1). (D.8)
However, by our assumption on l, jl−1 6= jl′−1. Because jl−1, jl′−1 ∈ S and jl−1 6= jl′−1, by the construction
of PN , τ(Pjl−1) 6= τ(Pjl′−1), a contradiction to (D.8). This shows that j1, . . . , jt−1 are all distinct.
By the construction of {j1, . . . , jt}, { f js(PN) | s = 1, . . . , t} = {τ(Pjs) | s = 1, . . . , t}. Define the
allocation µ such that µ(i) = τ(Pi) for all i ∈ {j1, . . . , jt} and µ(i) = fi(PN) for all i ∈ N \ {j1, . . . , jt}.
Clearly µ Pareto dominates f (PN) at PN , which violates Pareto efficiency of f at PN . This completes the
proof of Claim D.2. 
Claim D.3. For all PN ∈ P
r−1
N and all s = 1, . . . , r − 1, we have fis(PN) = τ(Pis).
Proof of Claim D.3. Fix PN ∈ P
r−1
N . We prove this in two steps.
Step 1. In this step, we show that fis(PN)Pis a for all s = 1, . . . , r − 1. Assume for contradiction that
aRis∗ fis∗ (PN) for some s
∗ ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}. Consider the preference profile P̃N such that P̃it = Pit for all
t = 1, . . . , s∗ − 1 and τ(P̃i) = a, otherwise. By the recursive definition of ζ
NI
a ,
fis∗ (P̃N) = a. (D.9)
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Since τ(P̃i) = a for all i ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , is∗−1}, (D.9) implies that fis∗ (P̃N) = τ(P̃is∗ ) and fis∗ (P̃N)P̃i fi(P̃N) for
all i ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , is∗}. Therefore, by moving the preferences of all the individuals i ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , is∗}
from P̃i to Pi, and by applying top-envy-proofness condition every time, it follows from the construction
of P̃N that
fis∗ (P̃is∗ , P−is∗ ) = a. (D.10)
By strategy-proofness, (D.10) implies
fis∗ (PN)Ris∗ a. (D.11)
By Claim D.2, there exists j ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , ir−1} such that f j(PN) = a. Since j ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , ir−1} and
f j(PN) = a, (D.11) implies fis∗ (PN)Pis∗ a, a contradiction to our assumption. This proves fis(PN)Pis a for all
s = 1, . . . , r − 1.
Step 2. In this step, we show that fis(PN) = τ(Pis) for all s = 1, . . . , r − 1. Assume for contradiction that
fis1 (PN) 6= τ(Pis1 ) for some s1 ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}. Let s1, . . . , su be the maximal sequence of distinct elements
such that {s1, . . . , su} ⊆ {1, . . . , r − 1} and fist+1 (PN) = τ(Pist ) for all t = 1, . . . , u − 1. Let j ∈ N be such
that f j(PN) = τ(Pisu ). By the maximality assumption of s1, . . . , su, either j ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , ir−1} or j = is1 .
We distinguish the following two cases.
CASE 1: Suppose j ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , ir−1}.
By the construction of su, we have fisu (PN) 6= τ(Pisu ). Also, since su ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, by Step 1,
fisu (PN)Pisu a. Combining the facts fisu (PN) 6= τ(Pisu ) and fisu (PN)Pisu a, we have
τ(Pisu ) Pisu fisu (PN) Pisu a. (D.12)
Also, since su ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, by the construction of PN , we have Pisu = P
(τ(Pisu );a). This, together with
(D.12), implies
τ(Pisu ) ≺ fisu (PN) ≺ a or a ≺ fisu (PN) ≺ τ(Pisu ). (D.13)
Since j ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , ir−1}, by the construction of PN , we have τ(Pj) = a. This, together with (D.13),
implies
a Pj fisu (PN) Pj τ(Pisu ). (D.14)
Since f j(PN) = τ(Pisu ), (D.12) implies f j(PN)Pisu fisu (PN). Furthermore, since f j(PN) = τ(Pisu ), (D.14)
implies fisu (PN) Pj f j(PN). However, the facts f j(PN)Pisu fisu (PN) and fisu (PN) Pj f j(PN) together contradict
Pareto efficiency of f at PN .
CASE 2: Suppose j = is1 .
By the construction of {s1, . . . , su} and j, we have { fist (PN) | t = 1, . . . , u} = {τ(Pist ) | t = 1, . . . , u}.
Let µ be the allocation such that µ(i) = τ(Pi) for all i ∈ {ist | t = 1, . . . , u} and µ(i) = fi(PN) for all
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i ∈ N \ {ist | t = 1, . . . , u}. Clearly, µ Pareto dominates f (PN) at PN , which violates Pareto efficiency of f
at PN .
Case 1 and Case 2 together complete Step 2, and Step 1 and Step 2 together complete the proof of Claim
D.3. 
Now we complete the proof of Lemma D.5. By Claim D.2, for every given PN ∈ P
r−1
N , there exists an
individual k ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , ir−1} such that fk(PN) = a. It remains to show that this individual is unique for
all preference profile in P r−1N , that is, fk(PN) = fk(P̃N) = a for all PN , P̃N ∈ P
r−1
N . Assume for contradiction
that f j(PN) = f j̃(P̃N) = a for some PN , P̃N ∈ P
r−1
N and j, j̃ ∈ N \ {i1, . . . , ir−1} such that j 6= j̃.
Consider the preference profile (P̃i1 , P−i1) ∈ P
r−1
N . Since PN , (P̃i1 , P−i1) ∈ P
r−1
N , by Claim D.3, we have
fi1(PN) = fi1(P̃i1 , P−i1). Using non-bossiness, fi1(PN) = fi1(P̃i1 , P−i1) implies
f (PN) = f (P̃i1 , P−i1).
Continuing in this manner, we can move the preferences of all individuals is, s = 0, . . . , r − 1, from the
preference Pis to P̃is one by one and obtain
f (PN) = f (P̃i1 , . . . , P̃ir−1 , P−{i1,...,ir−1}). (D.15)
The fact f j(PN) = a, together with (D.15), implies f j(P̃i1 , . . . , P̃ir−1 , P−{i1,...,ir−1}) = a. Since j ∈ N \ {i1,
. . . ir−1} and τ(Pi) = a for all i ∈ N \ {i1, . . . ir−1}, it follows from the fact f j(P̃i1 , . . . , P̃ir−1 , P−{i1,...,ir−1}) = a
that f j(P̃i1 , . . . , P̃ir−1 , P−{i1,...,ir−1}) = τ(Pj) and f j(P̃i1 , . . . , P̃ir−1 , P−{i1,...,ir−1})Pi fi(P̃i1 , . . . , P̃ir−1 , P−{i1,...,ir−1}) for
all i ∈ N \ {i1, . . . ir−1, j}. Therefore, by moving the preferences of all the individuals i ∈ N \ {i1, . . . ir−1, j}
from Pi to P̃i, and by applying top-envy-proofness condition every time, we obtain
f j(Pj, P̃−j) = a. (D.16)
Since f j̃(P̃N) = a and j 6= j̃, we have f j(P̃N) 6= a. Moreover, j ∈ N \ {i1, . . . ir−1} implies τ(P̃j) = a.
Combining the facts f j(P̃N) 6= a and τ(P̃j) = a, we obtain aP̃j f j(P̃N). However, this, together with (D.16),
contradicts strategy-proofness of f . This completes the proof of Lemma D.5. 





a) = ir. This completes the recursive definition of ζ
NI
a , and thereby completes the construction of Γa.
Similarly for each object, an inheritance tree is constructed. Thus, we have constructed a collection of
inheritance trees Γ, based on the assignment rule f .
Now, we prove f (PN) = f
Γ(PN) for all PN ∈ PN , where f
Γ is the hierarchical exchange rule associated
with Γ.
26
D.2.2 f (PN) = f
Γ(PN) for all PN ∈ PN
Fix PN ∈ PN . We show f (PN) = f
Γ(PN). We prove this by induction on the stages of f
Γ at PN .
Base Case: Assignments in Stage 1.
(i) fi(PN) = f
Γ




N) = fi(PN) for all i ∈ W
1(PN), where P
′







Proof of the Base Case. First, we prove a claim that we use in the proof of the Base Case.
Claim D.4. Let i ∈ N and let a ∈ E1(i, PN). Suppose P̃N ∈ PN is such that τ(P̃i) = a. Then fi(P̃N) = a.




a) = i where v
1
a is the root-node of
Ta.




a) = i implies that
fi(P̄N) = a for all P̄N ∈ PN with τ(P̄j) = a for all j ∈ N. (D.17)
Now we show fi(P̃N) = a for all P̃N with τ(P̃i) = a. Consider the preference profile (P̃i, P̂−i) such that
τ(P̂j) = a for all j 6= i. By (D.17), we have fi(P̃i, P̂−i) = a. Since τ(P̃i) = a, fi(P̃i, P̂−i) = a, and τ(P̂j) = a
for all j 6= i, we have fi(P̃i, P̂−i) = τ(P̃i) and fi(P̃i, P̂−i)P̂j f j(P̃i, P̂−i) for all j 6= i. Therefore, by moving the
preferences of all the individuals j 6= i from P̂j to P̃j, and by applying top-envy-proofness condition every
time, we have fi(P̃N) = a. This completes the proof of Claim D.4. 
Now, we proceed to prove the Base Case. First we show (i) of the Base Case. Fix i ∈ W1(PN). We com-
plete the proof for (i) of the Base Case by using another level of induction on the number of individuals
in C1(i, PN).
Base Case (for (i) of the Base Case). Suppose |C1(i, PN)| = 1. It follows from the definition of f
Γ that
T1(i, PN) ∈ E1(i, PN) and T1(i, PN) = τ(Pi). Therefore, by Claim D.4, we have
fi(PN) = T1(i, PN). (D.18)
By the definition of f Γ, |C1(i, PN)| = 1 means
f Γi (PN) = T1(i, PN). (D.19)
By (D.18) and (D.19), we have fi(PN) = f
Γ
i (PN). This completes the proof of Base Case (for (i) of the Base
Case). Note that since PN ∈ PN and i ∈ W
1(PN) are chosen arbitrarily, using similar logic as above, we
have f j(P̃N) = f
Γ
j (P̃N) for all P̃N ∈ PN and all j ∈ W
1(P̃N) with |C1(j, P̃N)| = 1.




Induction Hypothesis (for (i) of the Base Case). Let u ≥ 2. Assume that fi(PN) = f
Γ
i (PN) for |C1(i,
PN)| = u− 1. Assume, furthermore, that for all P̃N ∈ PN and all j ∈ W
1(P̃N) such that |C1(j, P̃N)| = u− 1,
we have f j(P̃N) = f
Γ
j (P̃N).
We show fi(PN) = f
Γ
i (PN) for |C1(i, PN)| = u. Let C1(i, PN) = {j1, . . . , ju} such that for all l = 1, . . . , u,




Take P̂j1 = Pju and P̂ju = Pj1 . By the construction of P̂j1 and the definition of f
Γ, it follows that τ(P̂j1) ∈
E1(j1, PN). Since τ(P̂j1) ∈ E1(j1, PN), by Claim D.4, we have
f j1(P̂j1 , P̂ju , P−j1,ju) = f j1(P̂j1 , P−j1) = τ(P̂j1). (D.20)
By the definition of C1(i, PN) and the construction of P̂ju , it follows that |C1(ju, (P̂j1 , P̂ju , P−j1,ju))| = |C1(ju,
(P̂ju , P−ju))| = u − 1. Therefore, by Induction Hypothesis (for (i) of the Base Case), we have
f ju(P̂j1 , P̂ju , P−j1,ju) = f
Γ
ju
(P̂j1 , P̂ju , P−j1,ju), and (D.21a)
f ju(P̂ju , P−ju) = f
Γ
ju
(P̂ju , P−ju). (D.21b)
By the definition of f Γ, we have
f Γj1(PN) = τ(Pj1), and (D.22a)
f Γju(P̂j1 , P̂ju , P−j1,ju) = f
Γ
ju
(P̂ju , P−ju) = τ(P̂ju). (D.22b)
Since P̂ju = Pj1 , combining (D.21) and (D.22b), we obtain
f ju(P̂j1 , P̂ju , P−j1,ju) = f ju(P̂ju , P−ju) = τ(Pj1). (D.23)
Since f j1(PN) 6= f
Γ
j1
(PN) by our assumption, (D.22a) and (D.23) together imply
f ju(P̂j1 , P̂ju , P−j1,ju)Pj1 f j1(PN). (D.24)
By (D.20) and (D.23), we have
fh(P̂j1 , P̂ju , P−j1,ju) = fh(P̂h, P−h) for all h = j1, ju. (D.25)
Since P̂j1 = Pju , by (D.20), we have f j1(P̂j1 , P̂ju , P−j1,ju) = τ(Pju), which in particular means
f j1(P̂j1 , P̂ju , P−j1,ju)Rju f ju(PN). (D.26)
However, (D.24), (D.25) and (D.26) together contradict pairwise reallocation-proofness of f . This com-
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pletes the proof of (i) of the Base Case. Note, furthermore, that since PN ∈ PN and i ∈ W
1(PN) are chosen
arbitrarily, using similar logic as above, we have
f j(P̃N) = f
Γ
j (P̃N) for all P̃N ∈ PN and all j ∈ W
1(P̃N). (D.27)
Now we show (ii) of the Base Case. Fix P′N ∈ PN such that for all i ∈ W
1(PN) either τ(P
′
i ) = fi(PN) or
P′i = Pi. From (i) of the Base Case, we have fi(PN) = f
Γ
i (PN) for all i ∈ W
1(PN). This, together with the
definition of f Γ, implies
fi(PN) = τ(Pi) for all i ∈ W
1(PN). (D.28)
It follows from the construction of P′N and (D.28) that τ(P
′
i ) = τ(Pi) for all i ∈ W
1(PN). This, together







i (PN) for all i ∈ W
1(PN). (D.29b)
(D.29) and (D.27) together complete the proof of (ii) of the Base Case. This completes the proof of the Base
Case. 
Now, we proceed to prove the induction step.
Induction Hypothesis: Fix a stage t ≥ 2. Assume that
(i) fi(PN) = f
Γ




N) = fi(PN) for all i ∈ W
t−1(PN), where P
′








(i) fi(PN) = f
Γ




N) = fi(PN) for all i ∈ W
t(PN), where P
′
N is such that for all i ∈ W
t(PN) either τ(P
′
i ) = fi(PN)
or P′i = Pi.
First, we prove a claim.
Claim D.5. Let i ∈ N \ Wt−1(PN) and let a ∈ Et(i, PN). Suppose P̃N ∈ PN is such that P̃j = Pj for all
j ∈ Wt−1(PN) and τ(P̃i, A \ F
t−1(PN)) = a. Then, fi(P̃N) = a.
Proof of Claim D.5. Since i ∈ N \ Wt−1(PN) and a ∈ Et(i, PN), it follows from the definition of f
Γ that
there exists r ≥ 1 such that there is a path (v1a, . . . , v
r
a) in Ta from v
1





























First, we show that fi(P̄N) = a for all P̄N ∈ PN such that P̄j = Pj for all j ∈ W
t−1(PN) and τ(P̄j) = a
for all j ∈ N \ Wt−1(PN). Fix P̄N ∈ PN such that P̄j = Pj for all j ∈ W
t−1(PN) and τ(P̄j) = a for all
j ∈ N \ Wt−1(PN). If r = 1, then a ∈ E1(i, PN), and hence by Claim D.4, we have fi(P̄N) = a. Suppose
r > 1. Let S = {ζNIa (v
s
a) | s = 1, . . . , r − 1}. By construction, S ⊆ W
t−1(PN). Consider the preference
profile P̂N such that P̂j = P
( f j(PN);a) for all j ∈ S, τ(P̂j) = a for all j ∈ W
t−1(PN) \ S, and P̂j = P̄j for all
















(PN), by the construction
of Γa, we have
fi(P̂N) = a. (D.30)
By the construction of P̂N , τ(P̂j) = a for all j ∈ N \ S. Since i ∈ N \ W
t−1(PN), S ⊆ W
t−1(PN), and
τ(P̂j) = a for all j ∈ N \ S, by (D.30), we have fi(P̂N) = τ(P̂i) and fi(P̂N)P̂j f j(P̂N) for all j ∈ W
t−1(PN) \ S.
Therefore, by moving the preferences of all the individuals j ∈ Wt−1(PN) \ S from P̂j to Pj, and by applying
top-envy-proofness condition every time, we have
fi(PN) = a, (D.31)
where Pj = P̂j for all j /∈ W
t−1(PN) \ S and Pj = Pj for all j ∈ W
t−1(PN) \ S. By the construction of PN ,
for all j ∈ Wt−1(PN), either τ(Pj) = f j(PN) or Pj = Pj. Therefore, by (ii) of the Induction Hypothesis, we
obtain
f j(PN) = f j(PN) for all j ∈ W
t−1(PN). (D.32)
Take j ∈ S. Consider the preference profile P′′N , where P
′′
j = Pj and P
′′
k = Pk for all k 6= j. Since for all
k ∈ Wt−1(PN), either τ(P
′′
k ) = fk(PN) or Pk = Pk, by (ii) of the Induction Hypothesis, f j(P
′′
N) = f j(PN).
By (D.32), this means f j(P
′′





N) = f j(PN), by non-bossiness, we have f (P
′′
N) = f (PN). By moving the preferences of all individuals
j ∈ S from Pj to Pj one by one and every time applying a similar logic, we conclude
f (P̄N) = f (PN). (D.33)
Combining (D.31) and (D.33), we have
fi(P̄N) = a. (D.34)
Now we complete the proof of Claim D.5. Take P̃N such that P̃j = Pj for all j ∈ W
t−1(PN) and τ(P̃i,
A \ Ft−1(PN)) = a. By (D.34) and the construction of P̄N , we have fi(P̄N) = τ(P̄i) and fi(P̄N)P̄j f j(P̄N) for
all j /∈ Wt−1(PN) ∪ {i}. Therefore, by moving the preferences of all the individuals j /∈ W
t−1(PN) ∪ {i}
from P̄j to P̃j, and by applying top-envy-proofness condition every time, we obtain
fi(P̄i, P̃−i) = a. (D.35)
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Since f is strategy-proof, (D.35) implies
fi(P̃N)R̃ia. (D.36)
By the choice of P̃N , we have P̃j = Pj for all j ∈ W
t−1(PN). By (ii) of the Induction Hypothesis
f j(P̃N) = f j(PN) for all j ∈ W
t−1(PN). (D.37)
Since τ(P̃i, A \ F
t−1(PN)) = a, (D.36) and (D.37) together imply fi(P̃N) = a. This completes the proof of
Claim D.5. 
Now the proof of the induction step follows by using similar logic as for the proof of the Base Case
with Claim D.5 in place of Claim D.4.
Appendix E Proof of Proposition 7.1
Proof of Proposition 7.1. Let f Γ be a hierarchical exchange rule on PN . Assume for contradiction that f
Γ
does not satisfy group-wise reallocation-proofness. Then, there must exist PN ∈ PN , a set of individuals
S ⊆ N, a preference profile P̃S of the individuals in S, and an allocation µ̂ of { f
Γ
S (P̃S, P−S)} over S where
µ̂ 6= f ΓS (P̃S, P−S) such that
(i) µ̂(i)Ri f
Γ
i (PN) for all i ∈ S,
(ii) µ̂(j)Pj f
Γ
j (PN) for some j ∈ S, and
(iii) f Γi (P̃i, P̃S\{i}, P−S) = f
Γ
i (P̃i, PS\{i}, P−S) for all i ∈ S.
Condition (ii) implies that there exists i∗ ∈ S such that µ̂(i∗)Pi∗ f
Γ
i∗(PN). Moreover, it follows from the
definition of µ̂ that there exists a set of individuals {i1 = i




for all h = 1, . . . , m. Since µ̂(i∗)Pi∗ f
Γ
i∗(PN), this, together with Condition (iii) and strategy-proofness of f
Γ,
implies m ≥ 2. Combining all these observations with Condition (i), we have
f Γih+1(P̃S, P−S)Rih f
Γ
ih
(PN) for all h = 2, . . . , m, and (E.1a)




Claim E.1. f Γih(PN) ∈ A for all h = 1, . . . , m.
Proof of Claim E.1. Suppose f Γi2(PN) = ∅. Since f
Γ is strategy-proof, f Γi2(PN) = ∅ implies f
Γ
i2
(P̃i2 , P−i2) =
∅. This, together with Condition (iii), yields f Γi2(P̃S, P−S) = ∅, a contradiction to (E.1b). So, it must be that
f Γi2(PN) 6= ∅. (E.2)
31




P−i3) 6= ∅. Since f
Γ is strategy-proof, f Γi3(P̃i3 , P−i3) 6= ∅ implies
f Γi3(PN) 6= ∅. (E.3)
Continuing in this manner, we obtain
f Γih(PN) 6= ∅ for all h = 1, . . . , m. (E.4)
(E.4) completes the proof of Claim E.1. 
It follows from Claim E.1 that for all h = 1, . . . , m, there exists a stage sh of f
Γ at PN such that ih ∈
Wsh(PN).
Claim E.2. sh+1 ≤ sh for all h = 2, . . . , m.
Proof of Claim E.2. Assume for contradiction that there exists a h∗ ∈ {2, . . . , m} such that sh∗ < sh∗+1.
By (E.1a), we have f Γih∗+1(P̃S, P−S)Rih∗ f
Γ
ih∗
(PN). We complete the proof of Claim E.2 by distinguishing two
cases.




Since f Γ is Pareto efficient, f Γih∗+1(P̃S, P−S)Pih∗ f
Γ
ih∗
(PN) implies that there exists k ∈ N \ {ih∗} such that
f Γk (PN) = f
Γ
ih∗+1








k (PN) = f
Γ
ih∗+1
(P̃S, P−S) together imply





k (PN) ∈ A. It follows from the fact f
Γ
k (PN) ∈ A that there exists a stage sk of f
Γ at





(PN), by Lemma D.3, we
have sk < sh∗ . This, together with the fact that sh∗ < sh∗+1, implies sk < sh∗+1. Since ih∗+1 ∈ Wsh∗+1(PN),
k ∈ Wsk(PN), and sk < sh∗+1, by Lemma D.2, we have
f Γk (PN) = f
Γ
k (P̃ih∗+1 , P−ih∗+1). (E.5)
Furthermore, the facts ih∗+1 ∈ Wsh∗+1(PN), k ∈ Wsk(PN), and sk < sh∗+1 together imply ih∗+1 6= k. Since
f Γk (PN) ∈ A and ih∗+1 6= k, (E.5) implies
f Γk (PN) 6= f
Γ
ih∗+1
(P̃ih∗+1 , P−ih∗+1). (E.6)
However, the fact f Γk (PN) = f
Γ
ih∗+1
(P̃S, P−S) and Condition (iii) together contradict (E.6).




Since ih∗ ∈ Wsh∗ (PN), ih∗+1 ∈ Wsh∗+1(PN), and sh∗ < sh∗+1, by Lemma D.2, we have





Furthermore, since f Γih∗+1(P̃S, P−S) = f
Γ
ih∗
(PN), Condition (iii) and (E.7) together imply
f Γih∗ (P̃ih∗+1 , P−ih∗+1) = f
Γ
ih∗+1




However, by Claim E.1, we have f Γih∗ (PN) ∈ A. Since f
Γ
ih∗
(PN) ∈ A and ih∗ 6= ih∗+1, (E.8) implies that
f Γ(P̃ih∗+1 , P−ih∗+1) is not an allocation, a contradiction.
Since Cases 1 and 2 are exhaustive, this completes the proof of Claim E.2. 
Now, we complete the proof of Proposition 7.1. By Claim E.2, we have s1 ≤ s2. Moreover, by (E.1b),
we have f Γi2(P̃S, P−S)Pi1 f
Γ
i1






(PN), using a similar logic as for Case 1
in Claim E.2, we get a contradiction. This completes the proof of Proposition 7.1. 
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